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I. INTRODUCTION
Africa is changing rapidly and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular 
represents the region with the fastest growing population in the world, 
abounding with young people yearning for opportunities and change.1 Yet, 
this region also harbors many of the longest sitting presidents in the world, 
each accumulating more than thirty years at the helmet.2 From Angola to 
Zimbabwe, from Rwanda to the Congo, state leaders cling to power, often 
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1. Andrews Atta-Asamoah & Jean-Michel Severino, Head-to-head:  Is Africa’s Young 
Population a Risk or an Asset?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
25869838.
2. Jason Hanna, Africa’s Current Longest-Serving Leaders, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/19/africa/africa-gambia-longest-serving-leaders/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017, 3:13 PM).
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employing less than democratic techniques—from questionable referenda 
and flagrant constitutional amendments to flawed elections and excessive use 
of force—all with a view to defying the rules of democratic alternation, 
pushing people to succumb or leave. What are the inherent reasons for these 
state leaders’ behavior, why do they still succeed, what are the consequences 
for those voicing opposition, and what role is there to be played by 
international law in contributing to curtailing these seemingly unbounded 
and perpetual presidencies—or is the alternative worse?
This paper aims at highlighting some of the most notorious cases of 
close to unlimited governance, discussing underlying reasons for the status 
quo and potential contributions international law may offer in terms of 
safeguarding the human rights of the population and inducing a path towards 
democratic alternation. On a related level, the article sets out to demonstrate 
that the approach taken thus far towards African countries by international—
particularly European—actors with a view to stemming the flow of refugees 
and irregular migrants coming to their borders is shortsighted at best, if not 
utterly misconceived, even if moral considerations were to be set aside. As 
both the lack of prospects of democratic alternation and migration are 
interrelated, it is argued that only by addressing the former head-on, may the 
demand or need for the latter be sustainably reduced.
Hence, after exemplifying the systemic problem of bad governance by 
depicting a number of pertinent cases with similar traits of character situated 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, this paper will regard the ensuing consequences of 
this state of affairs through the lenses of refugee law—prior to discussing the 
various steps taken in particular by European actors in reaction to these 
consequences. Recognizing that addressing the causes of irregular migration 
is necessary, but far from sufficient, the ensuing section will point to 
underlying root causes as the explanans of refugee and migratory flows, and 
look for ways to tackle those root causes.
II. BACKDROP SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, represents the region with the 
youngest and fastest growing population in the world, yet also consists of
many of the poorest countries on the globe.3 At the same time, a number of 
the longest-sitting state leaders display various common traits, aimed at 
resisting democratic alternation, including flawed referenda, hasty 
constitutional amendments, political violence, and other forms of exclusion,
thus resulting in some instances in a lack of alternation over the course of 
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more than thirty years.4 Several countries which are negatively concerned in 
that way will be depicted below, in a geographical fashion, traveling from 
east to west.
A. Angola
Angola adopted a new constitution in 2010, opening for the sitting 
president, José Eduardo dos Santos, to ultimately sit for another ten years at 
the helmet, despite having accumulated already more than three decades in 
power.5 Historically, the head of the majority party automatically assumes 
the presidency, which, in real and democratic contests elsewhere is neither 
unusual, nor particularly questionable.6 Consequently, in a country 
dominated by one party, controlled by one strongman, it effectively leads to 
a freeze in alternation. To be true, the Constitution which, in many other 
regards conveys the impression, at first sight, of epitomizing human rights 
protection and modern division of power,7 also includes a clause according 
to which the president may be removed by parliament.8 But for this removal 
to happen, the Supreme Court or Constitutional Court, respectively, needs to 
approve, and all judges of these Courts are and have been appointed by the
President.9 Furthermore, while the Constitution states that the president’s
term shall last for five years, and fixes the maximum length in office to two 
terms,10 rendering former presidents who have already served two terms of 
office ineligible for election11 and declaring constitutional referenda 
impermissible,12 these are only ostensible hindrances. The president or one 
third of the members of the National Assembly may initiate a revision of the 
Constitution,13 which requires only a two-thirds majority in Parliament,14 and
would become effective without a grace period, such as an election cycle.
The enumeration of material limits to constitutional alternations is rather 
                                                          
4. Ken Opalo, Term Limits and Democratic Consolidation in Sub-Saharan Africa:  Lesson 
from Burundi, CONSTITUTIONNET (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-and-
democratic-consolidation-sub-saharan-africa-lessons-burundi.
5. Celia W. Dugger, Angola Moves to Make President Stronger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/world/africa/22angola.html.
6. Id.
7. CONSTITUTION art. 2, §§ 1–2 (2010) (Angl.).
8. Id. at art. 161(m).
9. Id. at art. 129, §§ 3–5.
10. Id. at art. 113, §§ 1–2.
11. Id. at art. 110, §§ 1–2(a–h).
12. CONSTITUTION art. 168, § 3 (2010) (Angl.).
13. Id. at art. 233.
14. Id. at art. 235, § 2.
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vague, and is silent with respect to term limits.15 Constitutional inertia or 
other constitutional safeguards thus appear to be largely absent.
B. Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo)
In the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), the sitting president 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso, already reigning for a total of more than thirty-two 
years, aimed at preserving his grip on power by changing the Constitution of 
2002.16 This Constitution stated that no one may be president for more than 
two consecutive terms,17 and no one aged seventy years or more may be
eligible to stand for office.18 Sassou-Nguesso would, even if one were to 
start the count of years after the 2002 constitution came into force, have 
exceeded his term limits in 2016, and he had already turned seventy-two 
years of age.19 Hence, Sassou-Nguesso pushed through a referendum in the 
fall of 2015 with a view to changing those pertinent constitutional limitations, 
intimidated the opposition—which eventually boycotted the referendum—
and claimed a more than ninety percent approval rate for the constitutional 
amendment.20 The fact that voter turnout was probably below five percent,
did not bother him. Apparently, no minimum participation seems to be 
required.21 Based on those results, the Constitution was changed, now 
removing presidential age-limitations,22 and opening for three presidential 
terms.23 Sassou-Nguesso thus claimed eligibility for yet another term.24
There were elections held with widespread repression and documented 
electoral fraud, most opposition candidates were jailed or fled the country, 
                                                          
15. See id. at art. 236.
16. Congo backs Sassou Nguesso Third-Term Bid by Landslide, BBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34646310.
17. CONSTITUTION art. 57 (2002) (Congo) (the Constitution was drafted in 2001, but adopted 
following a referendum held on Jan. 20, 2002); cf. CONSTITUTION art. 65 (2015) (Congo) (comparing that 
at that time, the term length was still seven years though).
18. CONSTITUTION art. 58 (2002) (Congo).
19. Grace Magu, Congo to Vote on Extending the Two Term Presidential Limit, FAMILY.TODAY 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://familynews.today/congo-to-vote-on-extending-the-two-termpresidentiallimitp1277-
153.htm.
20. Congo-Brazzaville:  92% Des Électeurs Pour Une Nouvelle Constitution, RFI (Nov. 27, 
2015), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20151027-congo-brazzaville-92-electeurs-favorables-nouvelle-constitut
ion.
21. Id.
22. Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 66 (2015) (Congo).
23. Id. at art. 65 (distinguishing that the only concession was that presidential terms henceforth 
would last for five instead of seven years).
24. Congo-Brazzaville:  Referendum Passes Allowing President to Extend Rule, ALLAFRICA
(Oct. 27, 2015), http://allafrica.com/stories/201510270558.html.
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and Sassou-Nguesso proclaimed himself winner.25 Apart from flagrant 
violations even of established legal and constitutional provisions, no 
constitutional inertia or other constitutional safeguards26 exist against what 
James Madison once described as the danger of arbitrary government and the 
current mores of oppressive majorities, or, as here, oppression itself.27
C. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Meanwhile, a similar attempt at extending the constitutionally 
prescribed term limits occurred in neighboring DRC, where the sitting 
president Joseph Kabila’s second and last reelection term was up in 
November 2016.28 Unable to push constitutional changes regarding 
presidential term limits directly through, which, according to Article 220 of 
the Constitution of 2006, could not be the object of revision,29 he opted for a 
subtle twist: the ‘glissement’, or ‘slip’.30 The argument goes as follows, 
according to Article 70 of the Constitution,31 the president remains in power 
until elections of a new president have been concluded.32 Hence, as long as 
no new elections have taken place, which the current regime seems to do 
everything to prevent, Kabila shall remain in power.33 Maximizing on this 
vague definition, the president and his followers seem to have done 
                                                          
25. Edward McAllister, EU and U.S. Condemn Post-Election Violence in Republic of Congo,
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-idUSKCN0X5
1BV.
26. E.g., CONSTITUTION art. 85 (2015) (Congo) (requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament
and/or the coming into force of any constitutional amendments not until after an ensuing parliament has 
been elected). The president and members of parliament have a concurrent right to propose constitutional 
revisions.  If the president initiates a revision, and the Supreme Court (whose members according to art. 
172 are appointed for life by the president) does not object, the revision proposal may directly be submitted 
to a referendum.  Hence, also the provisions of the Constitution of 2015 hardly qualify as constitutional 
safeguards properly so called, see CONSTITUTION art. 172, 241 (2015) (Congo).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
28. Maud Jullien, DR Congo President Unlikely to Give Up Power, BBC NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35072001.
29. Compare id. (the current president is suspected of staying in power past his presidential 
term) with CONSTITUTION art. 70, 220 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo) (the length and number of presidential 
terms may not be changed, and hence are fixed according to art. 70 to a five-year term, renewable once).
30. William Clowes, DR Congo’s Joseph Kabila is Taking a Slippery Path to a Third Term,
QUARTZ AFR. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://qz.com/569612/dr-congos-joseph-kabila-is-taking-a-slippery-path-
to-a-third-term/.
31. CONSTITUTION art. 70, § 2 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
32. Id.
33. Cf. Xavier Monnier, L’art de Retarder Les Élections en RDC, Raconté Par l’un de Ses 
Stratèges, LE MONDE (July 15, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2016/07/18/l-art-
de-retarder-les-elections-en-rdc-raconte-par-l-un-de-ses-strateges_4971074_3212.html.
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everything to render the timely organization of elections even logistically 
impossible.34 Demonstrations in support of respecting the constitution, 
organizing elections, and requesting the president to respect the term limits, 
were met with force, resulting in at least fifty-three deaths and several 
hundred arbitrary arrests.35 When the opposition denounced such 
interpretation as unconstitutional, and even appealed to the Constitutional 
Court, the Court voted in favor of the president’s view.36 However, as it 
turned out, the Constitutional Court’s judgment was unconstitutional itself 
even if judged by its own standards and legal basis.37 The Constitutional 
Court consists of nine judges, seven are needed for a quorum, but only five 
were actually present—some had excused themselves as sick, others had left 
the country.38 Meanwhile, the stalemate continued and it was only when the 
National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO)39 intervened that some 
negotiations between opposition and governing party occurred, with a view 
to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. The talks under the aegis of 
CENCO eventually yielded an agreement, under the terms of which
presidential elections were to be held by the end of 2017, at which time at the 
latest president Kabila was to resign definitely, the opposition was to get to 
choose the prime minster, and the head of the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (CENI)40 supervising the preparations for the long-overdue 
elections.41 However, solution of remaining points of discord and, above all, 
implementation of the terms of the agreement, have come to an impasse, with 
the governing party continuing what appear to be stalling tactics.  And with 
every day that passes, CENCO is more likely to discontinue offering its good 
offices, and preparations for the envisioned presidential election before the 
end of the year—the paramount precondition of the agreement—less likely 
to see the light of day. The recent death of Etienne Tshisekedi, the historical,
                                                          
34. Id.
35. Cf. Violences de Septembre en RDC:  L’ONU Accuse Les Forces de Sécurité, RFI: AFRIQUE
(Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161021-violences-septembre-rdc-forces-ordre-accusees-onu.
36. David Kode, Movement Builds to Stop Congo’s President from Postponing Election,
WAGINGNONVIOLENCE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2016), http://wagingnonviolence.org/2016/12/congo-kabila-post
pone-election/.
37. RDC:  Les Juges de la Cour Constitutionnelle à Couteaux Tirés, RFI: AFRIQUE (Nov. 4, 
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161104-rdc-juges-cour-constitutionnelle-couteaux-tires.
38. Id.
39. Conférence Episcopale Nationale du Congo (CENCO).
40. Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI).
41. Cf. RDC:  Signature de l'Accord Par la Majorité et l'Opposition, RFI: AFRIQUE (Dec. 31, 
2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161231-rdc-majorite-opposition-cenco-kabila-joseph-eveques.
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most respected and uniting opposition figure, designated as head of CENI for 
the period of transition, does not bode well for the further process.42
D. Rwanda
Also, Rwanda has seen increasing repression and a decreasing political 
space over the past few years.43 Long hailed as an exemplary country in a 
Sub-Saharan, and post-violence context, and strategically playing the 
‘genocide card’ whenever criticism towards human rights abuses at the hand 
of the government mounted, the political situation in the country has adopted 
most of the traits of a one-party state.44 There seems to exist no real 
opposition to Paul Kagame, and claims to the contrary, such as pointing to 
the so-called ‘Green Party’, the only registered and authorized opposition 
party, appear to be a means of paying lip service to foreign donors.45 A recent 
attempted visit by a foreign reporter demonstrated that the ‘Green Party’ was 
barely visible in the streets, even its headquarters were hard to find, and 
hardly staffed.46 In such an environment, Kagame pushed through a 
referendum for a constitutional amendment removing the limitation of sitting 
for a maximum of two terms as president.47 Taking a climate of repression 
and control, reports of forced voting, and insufficient time to even debate the 
amendments to the constitution into account, it is probably not surprising that 
the majority of Rwandans approved these changes, now effectively allowing 
Kagame to stay on for a total of more than thirty years.48 But is a 
constitutional amendment, even if approved by a large majority, valid in such
a context? The idiosyncratic nature of the constitutional amendment,49
                                                          
42. Cf. Mort de Tshisekedi en RDC:  Quel Impact Sur le Dialogue Politique?, RFI: AFRIQUE 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170202-mort-tshisekedi-rdc-quel-impact-le-dialogue-politi
que.
43. Omar S. McDoom, To Aid, or Not to Aid?  The Case of Rwanda, UNITED NATIONS U. (Apr. 
29, 2013), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html.
44. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda:  Progress or Powder Keg?, 26 J. DEMOCRACY 19, 22 (2015); 
World Bank:  Economic Growth in Africa Down to 1.6 pct, DAILY SABAH (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.
dailysabah.com/economy/2016/10/04/world-bank-economic-growth-in-africa-down-to-16-pct.
45. Bruno Meyerfeld, Au Rwanda, Les Opposants se Font Discrets, LE MONDE (Aug. 9, 2016, 
11:41 AM), http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/08/09/au-rwanda-les-opposants-se-fontdis
crets_4980295_3210.html.
46. Id.
47. Jesko Johannsen, Rwandans Head to Polls in Controversial Referendum, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.dw.com/en/rwandans-head-to-polls-in-controversial-referendum/a-
18922926.
48. Id.
49. Cf. Filip Reyntjens, The Changes Made to Rwanda’s Constitution are Peculiar—Here’s 
Why, CONVERSATION (Jan. 28, 2016, 9:25 AM), http://theconversation.com/the-changes-made-torwandas
-constitution-are-peculiar-heres-why-53771.
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tailored to one person only, Kagame, has been criticized for undermining 
democratic change of government contrary also to article 23 of the African 
Charter of Democracy, Elections and Governance, which states that “illegal 
means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional 
change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the African 
Union (AU).”50
E. Burundi
The final examples of bad governance in this belt of African Great 
Lakes countries pertains to Burundi, where the sitting president, Pierre 
Nkurunziza, pushed through a disputed third mandate, claiming that the term 
limits applied only to a president who, as required by the constitution, was 
elected ‘by the people’, i.e. “by universal direct suffrage.”51 However, 
Nkurunzizas first term came about through negotiations following the peace 
agreements that ended the civil war in Burundi, and hence he was elected by 
Parliament then, not by the people.52 But instead of having an open political 
dialogue, as in the countries depicted above, a similar pattern of repression 
and political violence emerged, where even judges on the Constitutional 
Court apparently had been pressured to decide the question, raised by the 
opposition, of an unconstitutional extension of term limits, as in line with the 
president’s view.53 At least one of these judges soon afterwards fled the 
country and reportedly applied for asylum.54
Furthermore, Burundi has in recent months refused to cooperate with 
the United Nations (U.N.), including giving a group of experts, among them
the AUs Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), access to continue their independent 
investigations into the security and human rights situation in the country.55
                                                          
50. Cf. Ivan R. Mugisha, EU Questions Constitutional Amendment in Rwanda, E. AFR. (Dec. 4, 
2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EU-questions-constitutional-amendmentin
Rwanda/2558-2984382-gb8oyt/index.html.
51. Cf. CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2005) (Burundi).
52. Morgan Winsor, Burundi Elections 2015:  President Nkurunziza Should Withdraw Third 
Term Bid, Former Leader Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 4, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
burundi-elections-2015-president-nkurunziza-should-withdraw-third-term-bid-former-1907861.
53. Edmund Kagire, Exiled Burundian Judge Sylvere Nimpagaritse Speaks Out, E. AFR. (May 
7, 2015, 8:31 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Exiled-Burundian-judge-SylvereNimpagaritse
-speaks-out/-/2558/2709602/-/j3371vz/-/index.html.
54. See id.
55. Matthew Russell Lee, From Burundi, UN Human Rights Experts Banned, Unable to Deploy, 
OHCHR Says, INNER CITY PRESS (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.innercity
press.com/burundi237banthirdterm012616.html; Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, 
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RTS.,
 
2017] Syring                                                     325
Based on what the experts had seen and researched thus far, the United 
Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) report stated, inter 
alia, that there were serious reasons for believing that “gross human rights 
violations [which may] amount to crimes against humanity” may have been 
committed.56 The report was published in September 2016.57 A few weeks 
later, the Burundian government announced that it would withdraw from the 
International Criminal Court (ICC),58 the sole international court with 
jurisdiction over international crimes, including crimes against humanity,
without limitations in terms of temporal or geographical scope, or official 
capacity of the accused, for example as head of state or government.59
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BAD GOVERNANCE
What the above countries have in common is that wherever possible, 
they tried to at least give the impression of paying heed to constitutional 
rules, basing changes to term limits or other constitutional provisions 
benefitting the president and the ruling party on constitutional provisions 
presumably allowing just that—without regard to the context and form in 
which such changes could be regarded as legitimate. That some of these 
provisions even opened for certain term extensions and other revisions that 
may benefit the very government proposing the changes, without the 
common constitutional safeguards of e.g. at least one electoral period 
between the suggested revision and the coming into force of such changes, 
may be regarded as a flaw in itself. But combined with an environment of 
repression and abuse of power, precluding any meaningful political 
opposition to the ruling party and discussion of the proposed changes, the 
various modes of constitutional amendments may hardly be described as 
legitimate from an objective point of view60—they would often more 
appropriately be called constitutional coups d’état.
                                                          
http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2017).
56. Cf. Rep. of the U.N. Indep. Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB) on Its Thirty-Third Session, 
U.N. Doc S-24/1, at 14 (2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the UNIIB].
57. Id.
58. See Burundi:  ICC Withdrawal Major Loss to Victims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 27, 2016, 
12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/27/burundi-icc-withdrawal-major-loss-victims.
59. Other international courts with similar subject matter jurisdiction, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) had their competences restricted in geographical (cf. ICTY Statute, art. 1) or temporal (cf. ICTR 
Statute, art. 1) scope.  
60. See Democratic Republic of Congo:  Background and U.S. Relations, EVERYCRS
REPORT.COM (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43166.html.
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Also, quite telling when it comes to the disregard of the true 
(teleological) meaning of constitutional provisions are the lack of respect 
paid to other, less visible provisions, or, more precisely, the creative 
inventions in order to hide unconstitutional behavior. Article 96 of the 
constitution of the DRC for example prohibits the president to be involved in 
any professional activity during his terms in office, though not his family.61
Recent research revealed that Joseph Kabila’s family had an interest in, and 
often controlled, at least seventy companies, in almost any sector of 
importance, from banking to agriculture, from petroleum and mining to 
transportation and hotel business, in the DRC but also abroad, resulting in 
contracts worth several hundred million dollars.62 Joseph Kabila himself is 
associated directly only with two of these companies.63 But there seems to 
be little doubt as to the origin of all the other family contracts, and even 
Kabila’s diplomatic adviser, Barnabe Kikaya Bin Karubi, is quoted as
trivializing the results of that research by stating that there is nothing unusual 
about the members of Kabila’s family having some advantages—after all, 
it’s the presidential family.64
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the population strata, context of 
suppression and meager outlook for improvement, many, and especially 
young, people flee, migrate, or otherwise try to leave the area of conflict, and 
move to neighboring areas or even beyond, seeking protection.65
A. Refugees and Migrants
While there is no universally accepted legal definition of migration, and 
hence of ‘irregular’ or ‘forced migrants’, the latter are sometimes referred to 
as “persons [either not having applied] for asylum [yet or] asylum seekers 
                                                          
61. CONSTITUTION art. 96 (2006) (Dem. Rep. Congo).
62. Michael Kavanagh, Thomas Wilson & Franz Wild, With His Family’s Fortune at Stake, 
President Kabila Digs In, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2016-12-15/with-his-family-fortune-at-stake-congo-president-kabila-digs-in.
63. See id.
64. See RDC:  Bloomberg Révèle l’Empire Économique Bâti Par la Famille Kabila, RFI (Dec. 
16, 2016), http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161216-rdc-agence-bloomberg-revele-empire-economique-bati-
famille-kabila-president.
65. Lucy Beck & Leo Dobbs ed., On the Run, Alone and Young:  Congolese Children Flee to 
Uganda, UNHCR (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2013/2/5113b67b6/run-alone-young-
congolese-children-flee-uganda.html; Esther Yu His Lee, The Huge Refugee Crisis That’s Already 
Displaced 220,000 People, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 17, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/the-huge-refugee-
crisis-thats-already-displaced-220-000-people-71e96cbb5ea0#.t1hiv48np.
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whose applications [were deemed] inadmissible.”66 The terms refugees and 
migrants are often used interchangeably, not least in public and popular, and 
certainly in populist discourse, and should be kept apart, especially when 
discussing rights attached to the respective status.67 However, for the 
purpose of the ensuing discussion, ‘irregular migration’ may be used to 
encompass (often large) movements of refugees and migrants alike, as the 
focus will be on the act of fleeing or migrating, not on the legal status 
eventually sought, received, or denied. IDPs on the other hand could be 
described as inhibited refugees, potentially having suffered the same 
persecution as ‘conventional refugees’, but not having been able to cross an
international border.68 Hence, they are unfortunately easily overlooked as,
alas, also here not directly relevant to this article.
Whether one employs the European Union (EU) definition of a refugee 
included in EU Qualification Directive 2011/95, the 1969 Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) definition, or in the United States, section 101(a)(42) 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), they are all based on the 1951 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee 
Convention as the common framework.69
“Refugee” means a third-country national who, 
                                                          
66. Press Release, European Commission, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement—
Questions and Answers, RAPID 16/1221 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Implementing the EU-Turkey 
Agreement].
67. ‘Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’–Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), UNHCR (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56e95c676/refugees-migrants-frequently-asked-ques
tions-faqs.html; Joshua Keating, The Difference Between Refugee and Migrant Matters, SLATEST (Aug. 
28, 2015, 10:56 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/08/28/the_terms_migrant_and_
refugee_should_not_be_used_interchangeably_the_difference.html.
68. Key Migration Terms, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://www.iom.int/key-migration-
terms (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2016); Council Directive 337/9, art. 2, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 13 (EU); G.A. 
Res. 429 (V), at 48 (Dec. 14, 1950); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa, AFR. COMMISSION ON HUM & PEOPLES’ RTS. (Sept. 10, 1969), http://www.achpr.org
/files/instruments/refugee-convention/achpr_instr_conv_refug_eng.pdf.
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owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality or political opinion, [or membership of 
a particular social group,] is outside the country of nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear . . . is unwilling to avail himself 
[or herself] of the protection of that country; or [a stateless person]
who, . . . being outside [of] the country of his [or her] former 
habitual residence [for the same reasons as mentioned above,] is 
unable or, owing to such fear, . . . is unwilling to return to it . . . .70
Additionally, so-called subsidiary protection may be available to a 
person who does not qualify as a refugee but “in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned 
. . . would face a real risk of suffering serious harm . . . .”71
B. The Drivers of Irregular Migration
As had been stated e.g. in the aforementioned UNIIB report, but is valid, 
mutatis mutandis, across the countries discussed above, and beyond the Sub-
Saharan region, the civil war in Burundi that ended in 2005 had a devastating 
effect on the economy and living standards.72 Following the Arusha 
Agreement, Burundi experienced a period of some stability and sustainable 
growth.73 The political crisis now, however, is reversing such progress.74
The climate of violence and repression has disrupted economic activity.75
Half of the youth are estimated to be unemployed and the majority of the 
demonstrators against the third presidential mandate were disenchanted 
youth.76 Their high numbers may also provide a large source of recruitment 
for nascent rebel and other armed opposition movements.77 But the latter is 
just one additional concern as to what neglected or not appropriately dealt 
with crises situations may lead to, also potentially regarding countries outside 
the region, including overseas.  However, as far as refugee and other 
migration flows are concerned, the UNIIB investigations clearly “confirmed 
                                                          
70. G. A. Res. 429 (V), supra note 69, at 48.
71. María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to Be Granted 
Asylum Under EC Law, 136 NEW ISSUES REFUGEE RES. (UNHCR) 1, 11 (Nov. 20, 2006).
72. See Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 14.
73. Id. at 14–15.
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. Rep. of the UNIIB, supra note 56, at 15. Employment here includes any kind of work, not 
just work on a regular salary, which anyways pertains to only a tiny fraction of the work force.
77. Cf. Id.
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the impact of the political crisis on the massive outflow” of people.78 It is 
also in line with common patterns of drivers of migration.
In general terms, drivers of migration consist of push and pull factors.79
Push factors include armed conflict, in particular prolonged armed conflict, 
where Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, but not least the conflict-ridden eastern part 
of the DRC would be prime examples.80 Another strong, contributing push 
factor is the political crisis, with, usually, concomitant political violence—as 
is currently taking place throughout the Sub-Saharan region.81 As
exemplified above, political crisis often carries with it situations of 
generalized or indiscriminate violence, individual insecurity, high 
unemployment, economic breakdown, sometimes additionally driven by 
natural disasters, utter lack of opportunity, and a sense of hopelessness.
These factors are often interrelated.
Pull factors often, but not always, represent the mirror image of push 
factors, with protection, political freedom, security, access to health (care), 
etc., looming large on the list.82
As may be seen, there is some reciprocity among push and pull factors.
Also, not all of these factors are related to or limited to ‘refugees’.
IV. ADDRESSING THE CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
In September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (GA) for the 
first time in the so-called New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 
explicitly acknowledged a connection between crises situations, the rule of 
law, or lack thereof, as well as marginalization, exclusion and the lack of 
development and large movements of refugees and migrants.83 The GA
pledged to “work with countries of origin to strengthen their capacities.”84
Furthermore,
                                                          
78 Id.
79. Migration Push/Pull Factors, APHG CLASS WIKI (Jan. 9, 2016, 10:45 PM), http://lewis
historicalsociety.com/wiki2011/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=28.
80. See, e.g., Root Causes of Migration—Fact Sheet, ONE AM., https://www.weareoneamerica
.org/root-causes-migration-fact-sheet (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
81. The Sub-Saharan Security Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/africa-
sub-saharan/sub-saharan-security-tracker/p37884 (last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
82. See Migration Push/Pull Factors, supra note 79.
83. Draft for Adoption, U.N. (July 29, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/popula
tion/migration/events/ga/documents/2016/1August2016/Outcome_Declaration.pdf; Press Release, 
U.N., New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants Adopted by all Member States at Historic UN 
Summit, U.N. Press Release (Sept. 19, 2016).
84. G.A. Res. A/71/1, ¶ 12 (Oct. 3, 2016).
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[r]ecognizing that armed conflict, persecution and violence, 
including terrorism, are among the factors which give rise to large 
refugee movements . . . [the signatories stated their intention] to 
address the root causes of such crisis situations and to prevent or 
resolve conflict by peaceful means [and to] work in every way 
possible for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the prevention of 
conflict and the achievement of the long-term political solutions 
required.85
Acknowledging further that “[t]he promotion of human rights is also 
critical,” the GA declared: “In addition, we will promote good governance, 
the rule of law, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions . . . .”86
It remains to be seen what may come of such a GA Declaration, non-
legally binding as it is in character. Furthermore, while some of the ideas 
expressed herein are laudable, there is reason to be concerned that the core 
of the problem, here only stated as an addendum, as will be argued below, 
will be overlooked or so vaguely defined as to be lost out of sight.
The current, prevailing way of addressing refugee flows may be 
exemplified by the region experiencing an unprecedented increase in people 
from the aforementioned and other crisis regions, including Syria, coming to 
their door steps, and applying for protection or other rights of stay. In order 
to stem the flow of new arrivals, the EU concluded an agreement with 
Turkey, one of the main countries through which migrants and refugees to 
Europe would travel, essentially offering money for border control, and 
tightened frontiers.87
                                                          
85. Id. at ¶ 64.
86. Id.
87. Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, as United Nations, International Organization for Migration Sign Key Agreement, U.N. Press 
Release GA/11820 (Sept. 19, 2016).
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Under the terms of the deal, all new ‘irregular migrants’—defined 
as persons either not having applied for asylum or asylum-seekers 
whose applications were deemed inadmissible—crossing from 
Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey. In other 
words, for every returned Syrian (the largest group of ‘irregular 
migrants’), another Syrian would be resettled to the EU from 
Turkey directly. In addition, Turkey promised to “take any 
necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes from Turkey 
to the EU.” In exchange, the EU would allocate [three] billion
[euros] under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, with an 
additional [three] billion [euros] to be mobilized by the end of 
2018. Lastly, and perhaps the main motivating factor for Ankara 
to enter into this accord, the EU promised an accelerated process 
to lift visa requirements for Turkish citizens.
In parallel proceedings, the EU is also pushing ahead with a 
migrant pact on Africa, offering similar incentives—a share in the 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa—to a number of African 
countries in exchange for stemming the flow of potential refugees 
to Europe.  The deal, already deemed “morally unacceptable” by 
several human rights organizations, may also be questionable on 
legal grounds.
Both the EU-Turkey and EU-Africa agreements include the 
contribution of large sums of money to enhance the situation for 
refugees already in the respective regions by creating employment 
and development programs. Although this approach addresses 
some of the root causes of migration, the problem is that it relies 
heavily on partners that, at least in part, have a rather dubious track 
record when it comes to the protection of human rights. These 
regimes, due to their repressive nature, represent the very reason a 
number of bona fides refugees try to leave.88
And looking at examples from the recent past should suffice as a 
reminder to tread carefully.
                                                          
88. Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement, supra note 66; Susan M. Akram & Tom Syring, 
Needed in Europe:  A Comprehensive Plan of Action on Refugees, https://www.asil.org/sites/default/
files/documents/IRLIGblog_AkramSyring.docx (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter A Comprehensive 
Plan of Action on Refugees]; see also Human Rights Organizations Slam New EU-Africa Migrant Pact,
DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 29, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/human-rights-organizations-slamneweu
africamigrantpact/a19365407?mc_cid=c9b2922399&mc_eid=1ca8e5dc24%20; Jeanne Park, Europe’s 
Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/refugees-and-the-displaced/europes-
migration-crisis/p32874 (last modified Sept. 23, 2015); see generally European Commission Press 
Release RAPID 15/6056, A European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (Nov. 12, 2015); European 
Commission Press Release RAPID 15/5597, Refugee Crisis: European Commission Takes Decisive 
Action—Questions and Answers (Sept. 9, 2015); The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, EUR.
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Prior to the ousting and death of Muammar Gaddafi, Italy and Libya 
reportedly executed an agreement that compensated Libya in return for 
cracking down on illegal migration routes stemming from, or in any case 
leading through, Libya.89 That agreement included an opening for Italian 
authorities to swiftly return intercepted boat migrants to Libya—a country 
which is not a State Party to the Refugee Convention—before they could 
even reach Italian shores.90 The agreement was criticized for not sufficiently 
differentiating between illegal migrants and genuine refugees, and in many 
cases not even having the necessary procedures in place for making a well-
informed decision in regard to refugee status determinations of the people 
intercepted at sea before they were returned.91
                                                          
COMMISSION: INT’L COOPERATION & DEV., http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-
trust-fund-africa_en (last visited Feb. 19, 2017); Turkey Warns EU:  Visa Deal or No Migrant Pact,
MIDDLE E. EYE (Apr. 21, 2016, 9:31 PM), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-warns-eu-visa-
deal-or-no-migrant-accord-866776688.
89. See Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum 
Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 21, 2009)
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around-0 [hereinafter Pushed Back]; see 
also Italy to Pay Libya $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/
world/europe/31iht-italy.4.15774385.html [hereinafter Italy to Pay]. 
90. Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89.
91. Pushed Back, supra note 89; Italy to Pay, supra note 89. 
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In the 2012 case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,92 the European 
Court of Human Rights, again sitting as a Grand Chamber, 
reiterated the gist of the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece,
and observed that “Libya’s failure to comply with its international 
obligations was one of the facts denounced in the international 
reports of that country.  In any event, . . . the existence of domestic 
laws and the ratification of international treaties guaranteeing 
respect for fundamental rights [as in said bilateral agreement 
between Italy and Libya] are not in themselves sufficient to ensure 
adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in 
the present case, reliable sources have reported practices resorted 
to or tolerated by the authorities which are manifestly contrary to 
the principles of the Convention . . . .  Italy cannot evade its own 
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral 
agreements with Libya.”93
The Court therefore unanimously held there had been a violation 
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on the 
part of Italy by exposing the applicants to the risk of being 
subjected to ill-treatment in Libya and to being repatriated to 
Somalia and Eritrea, the respective applicants’ home countries 
from which they had fled.94
Concerns have also been raised that readmission agreements, even 
where their conclusion would not be contrary per se to any 
provisions of international law, contribute to potential violations 
of refugee rights, including the denial of access to protection due 
to the accelerated procedures of expulsion which generally form 
part of such accords.95 Paying-off and redirecting refugee flows 
in that fashion to countries less concerned with, or feeling less 
bound by, the Refugee Convention—and the granting of rights 
pronounced therein—jeopardizes the fairness of the asylum 
system and thus the very idea underlying the concept of granting 
protection to those in need.96
Hence, the EU should think carefully about not entering into new, 
similar, potentially abusive, if not outright illegal, agreements—whether 
under the guise of development aid or other cooperation.
                                                          
92. See Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy, (No. 27765), Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2012); see also Tom 
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Akram & Tom Syring ed., 2014).
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Furthermore, what seems to be easily forgotten is that development aid 
is not neutral; to the contrary, all development aid is highly political.97 As 
has been pointed out elsewhere, 
[D]onors . . . usually insist that this money is politically neutral,
that it does not directly benefit the political elite. This is true, as 
most of the money is for schools, roads, health care, and water 
projects. But all development is deeply political. By taking over 
the financing of most public services, donors take pressure off . . .
the government to respond to the needs of its citizens.98
While details of the EU migrant pact on Africa were still in the planning, 
the EU-Turkey deal had already formally been in force for several months.99
It has led to a reduction of new arrivals, but the agreement continues to be
fragile.”100 And while the EU Trust Fund for Africa claims to aim at 
addressing the root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and 
irregular migration, there is little in the draft agreements that would promise 
sustainable success, for lack of identifying and addressing the real underlying 
problems at the origin of many of the countries’ deplorable state of affairs.101
V. ADDRESSING THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE CRISES
Dr. Denis Mukwege, who for many years has provided help to “victims 
of gang rape and brutal sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo,” said in his acceptance speech for the 2014 Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought that “women’s bodies have become a true battlefield 
and rape is being used as a weapon of war.”102 He also stated that “‘we have 
spent too much time and energy fixing the consequences of violence.  It is 
time to take care of the causes,’ and called on the EU and its member states 
                                                          
informal border controls and massive and sudden arrivals of migrants and refugees—as in regard to 
interceptions at sea—where monitoring procedures are generally lacking or insufficient, “the 
implementation of a readmission agreement may contribute to hinder access of asylum seekers to 
protection”).
96. Syring, supra note 92.
97. JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO 
AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 332 (2012).
98. Id.
99. See A Comprehensive Plan of Action on Refugees, supra note 88.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Sakharov laureate Denis Mukwege:  “Women’s Bodies Have Become a True Battlefield”, 
EUR. PARLIAMENT NEWS (Nov. 26. 2014, 1:24 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
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to use all instruments available to support resolving the conflicts in the 
region.”103 Transferred to the question of alternation, the underlying reasons 
for the causes, the root causes, appear to represent the real foundational issues 
when it comes to solving not only the lack of democratic alternation per se,
but also irregular migration and refugee situations. As long as 
mismanagement, embezzlement, systemic corruption, rampant impunity and 
a travesty of justice, of constitutions, and of elections are permitted, if not 
encouraged to take place, alternation, a hoped for democratization, and 
ensuing improvements for the countries affected is unlikely to materialize 
any time soon. The fossilization of the political systems104, a prolongation 
of the aforementioned perpetual presidencies and of bad governance will, in 
turn, continue to have a devastating effect on the youth, on development, or 
lack thereof, and hence contribute to a continuous need for and urge of 
fleeing one’s country or migrating in search of a better future. And, should 
the situation in any of the countries detailed above explode, or what is left of 
a functioning state apparatus implode, taking the violent recent history of 
especially the Great Lakes countries of Africa into account, there is a real 
concern that the security situation in the entire region might severely 
deteriorate and eventually collapse. Hence, western donors should have all 
the incentives to identify and address the real, underlying root causes, instead 
of opting for, or anyways focusing on, shortsighted ‘quick fixes’ and 
concomitant outsourcing of migration control.105
VI. OUTLOOK—WHAT MAY BE DONE?
Many of the Sub-Saharan countries discussed above do have elaborate 
and modern constitutions on paper—but abusive state leaders need to be 
reminded of existing constitutional provisions and held accountable for any 
unconstitutional changes.  This cannot be done unless donors, the EU, AU, 
and the United States, speak with one voice. In fact, in connection with the 
flawed referendum in Congo-Brazzaville, changing the constitution, French 
Prime Minister Francoise Hollande, when asked about it, answered in quite 
vague terms, actually stating that he respected any state leader’s right to 
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104 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Après les Coups d’État Militaire, l’Union Africaine à l’épreuve 
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105. Joe Siegle, The Political Origin of Refugee Crises, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 26, 
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consult his constituency.106 There was no mentioning and no criticism of the 
form and context of such ‘consultations.’107 Only after the equally flawed, 
ensuing elections and their violent aftermath did the French Foreign Minister, 
Jean-Marc Ayrault, eventually openly criticize Brazzaville.108 Given the 
traditionally strong ties with and position in Congo-Brazzaville the former 
colonial power France has maintained, a more candid, critical stance could 
have made a difference.
Also, on the regional, EU level, there are tentative signs of becoming
more outspoken in the face of human rights violations or electoral travesties 
of justice.  Federica Mogherini, the EU Head of Foreign Affairs, e.g.
criticized Gabon for its recent election, the very limited access given to EU 
election observers contrary to prior agreements, and indicated that the 
confidence of the people of Gabon regarding the integrity of the electoral 
process, may have been put at risk.109 Pushing for electoral observation 
missions and speaking up, are important starting points, not least by thus 
lending the opposition some witnessing eyes. But much more is needed.  
Ultimately having the threat of pursuing and prosecuting state leaders’ most 
egregious crimes before international courts up one’s sleeve, even if those 
institutions for the time being are openly defied by the persons concerned,
may still have an effect, as would working with the AU towards regarding 
constitutional coups d’état similarly critical as military coups d’état. All of 
the above may take a long time to realize, but the perhaps most important 
achievement would be a change of perspective, the realization and 
acknowledgement that the underlying root causes of many a refugee crisis—
the denial of alternation—need to be focused on.  And that could be 
accomplished immediately.
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